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In this paper we estimate price effects of trading and components of the bid-ask
spread on the Paris Bourse. We compare the outcomes of several well-known
estimators of bid-ask spread components. First, we estimate components of the bid-
ask spread by the Glosten-Harris (1988) model. The estimation results show that the
processing cost is lower for large transactions than for small ones. In line with
theoretical predictions, the adverse selection cost increases with trade size, and
is estimated between 25~ and 409b of total spread. We then use a reduced form
approach based on a Vector Auto Regression. Using the long run price effect as a
measure of the adverse selection cost, we estimate that between 50~ (for small
transactions) and 80qo (for large transactions) of the spread is due to asymmetric
information. There is no reversal of the direction of trade, which suggests that
inventory control is unlikely to be important on the Paris Bourse. Finally, wè
check the robustness of these results by less restrictive, direct estimates of
long-run price effects.
Keywords: microstructure, asymmetric information, VAR, persistence, robustness.1
Introduction.
There is by now a large literature that analyses transactions data for financial
markets. Among the issues in this literature are the dynamic properties of
transaction prices, and in particular the price effect of trading. Closely related
to this work is the issue of estimating the components of the bid-ask spread. Much
of the empirical literature in this area is based on theoretical models, although
more reduced forrn approaches are also popular. In this paper, we analyse price
effects of trading and the components of the bid-ask spread on a new data set from
the Paris Bourse. The Bourse operates a fully automated order processing system
(the CAC system) which gives very high quality limit order and transactions data.
We take several different approaches to estimating spread components. The two
main models that we use are the Glosten and Harris (1988) model and the VAR model
pioneered in market microstructure work by Hasbrouck (1991a,1991b,1993). The former
model is closely linked to market microstructure theory, whereas the latter adopts
a more agnostic, reduced form approach. We show that these models yield very
different component estimates. Moreover, we show that there is an important
difference between the effects of trading on mid-quotes and on transaction prices.
A methodological innovation in this paper is a test of the robustness of the
VAR approach. We propose a direct estimate of expected price changes due to a
transaction, and compare these estimates to the price effects implied by the VAR
model. We show that most conclusions of the VAR model stand up against this test,
although the VAR tends to overestimate the precision of the results.
This paper extends the analysis in De Jong et al. (1993), where we estimated
transaction costs in Paris and compared these with costs on a competing exchange,
SEAQ International in London. In the present paper we present a decomposition of
the realised spread in Paris into cost components and consider price effects of
trading.
The setup of the paper is as follows. In Section 1 we discuss the
institutional structure of the Bourse and the data. [n Section 2 we briefly discuss
the theoretical background of the bid-ask spread decomposi[ion. In Section 3 we
analyse the price effects of trading using structural models of transaction prices.
In Section 4 we apply the reduced form methodology developed by Hasbrouck (1991a,
1991b, 1993) to estimate of the price effects of trading. In Section 5 we check the
robustness of the results. In Section 6 we conclude.2
I. Institutional background and data.
In this section we briefly describe the trading structure on the Paris Bourse and
the data. The Bourse is a continuous auction market and uses a centralised
electronic system for displaying and processing orders, the Cotation Assistée en
Continu (CAC) system. This system, based on the Toronto Stock Exchange's CATS
(Computer Assisted Trading System), was first implemented in Paris in 1986. Since
then, trading in nearly all sccurities has been trdnsferred from the floor of the
exchange onto the CAC system. All the most actively traded French equities are
traded on a monthly settlement basis in round lots of 5 to 100 shares set by the
Société des Bourses FranFaises (SBF) to reflect their unit price. The SBF itself
acts as a clearing house for buyers and sellers, providing guarantees against
counterparty default. There are no specialists or professional market makers.
Instead, liquidity is provided by the public limit order book.
Every morning at 10 a.m. the trading day opens with a batch auction where all
eligible orders are filled at a common market clearing price. Nowadays the batch
auction is relatively unimportant, accounting for no more than 10 to 15~ of trading
volume. Its role is to establish an equilibrium price before continuous trading
starts. Continuous trading takes place from 10 a.m. to 5 p.m.
In the continuous trading session there are two types of orders possible,
limit orders and marke[ orders. Limit orders specify the quantity to be bought or
sold, a required price and a date for automatic withdrawal if not ezecuted by then,
unless the limit order is good till cancelled ("à révocation"). Limit orders cannot
be issued at arbitrary prices because there is a minimum "tick" size of FF 0.1 for
stock prices less than FF 500, and FF 1 for higher prices. More than one limit order
may be issued at the same price. To these orders, strict time priority for execution
applies.
Market orders only specify the quantity to be traded and are executed
immediately "au prix du marché", i.e. at the best price available. If the total
quantity of the limit orders at this best price do not suffice to fill the whole
market order, the remaining part of the market order is transformed into a limit
order at the transaction price (for a detailed description of this system see Biais
et al. (1992)). Hence, market orders do not automatically walk up the limit order
book, and do not always provide immediate execution of the whole orderl.
1 A trader who wants to trade a certain quantity immedia[ely can circumvent this
mechanism by placing a limit order at a very unfavourable pnce. This limit order
will then be executed against existing orders on the other side of the market that
show a more favourable price.3
After the opening, traders linked up to the CAC sys[em will see an onscreen
display of the "market by price". For both the bid side and the ask side of the
market, the five best limit order prices are displayed together with the quantity of
shares available at that price and the number of individual orders involved. The
difference between the best bid and ask price is known as the "fourchette". Brokers
can scroll down to further pages of the screen to view limit orders available beyond
the five best prices. In addition, some information concerning the recent history of
trading is given: time, price, quantity and buyer and seller identification codes
for the five last transactions, the cumula[ive quantity and value of all
transactions since the opening, and the price change from the previous day's close
to the latest transaction.
The member firms of the Bourse (the "Sociétés de Bourse") key orders directly
into the CAC system via a local terminal. All market participants can contribute to
liquidity by putting limit orders on display. There is some scope for negotiated
deals if the limit order book is ínsufficiently deep. A financial intermediary can
negotiate a deal directly with a client at a price lying within the current
fourchette, provided that the deal is immediately reported to the CAC system as a
"cross order". For trades at prices outside the fourchette, the member firm acting
as a principal is obliged to fill all central market limit orders displaying a
better price than the negotiated price within five minutes.
Our data set is a transcription of all changes in the trading screen
information for all shares on the CAC system for 44 trading days in the summer of
1991, starting May 25 and ending July 25. We have available a complete record of the
total limit order quantity at the five best prices on both the bid side and the ask
side of the market and all transactions. Due to the automated trading system, the
data are relatively clean. The time stamps indicate exacdy the time of the
transaction or quote change. Also, quote and trade information has the correct
sequence, so that it is possible to exactly find out who initiated the trade, the
buyer or the seller, by comparing the transaction price with the previous mid-quote,
i.e. the average of bes[ buy and sell limit order prices.
Concerning transactions, there is an indicator showing whether the transaction
is a"cross" negotiated outside the CAC system. Cross transactions need not be
reported immediately to the exchange, so that there may be errors in the reported
times of these transactions. We also have available broker identification codes of
the buying and selling parties, which allow us to identify series of small
transactions that were initiated by the same person as part of one large
transaction. The transaction price per share for such transactions is defined as the4
quantity weighted average of the price of the small transactions that together make
up the larger one.
In this paper, we use a sample of transactions in the shares of ten large
firms, with 4000 to 11,000 observations per stock. Most transactions involve a limit
order, so that it can exactly be determined who initiated the trade, buyer or
seller. For the "crosses", which are negotiated outside the CAC system, we use the
simple rule that transactions with a price above the mid-quote2 are deemed to be
buyer initiated, and below the mid-quote seller initiated. Transactions exactly at
the mid-yuote are not classified. The size of the transaction is the number of
shares traded, divided by the so-called Normal Market Size (NMS), which is a
transaction size set by the authorities on London's SEAQ International market, and
roughly rnrresponds to the median transaction size in that stock. For the Paris
marke[, 1 NMS corresponds to the 99`" percentile of the transaction size
distribution.
French shares are also tradeá on other exchanges, especially London's SEAQ
International. It would appear natural to analyse transactions data from both
markets simultaneously. There are good reasons not to include London data into the
analysis, however. Transactions in London are negotiated between traders and market
makers by telephone and are not publicly reported, so that other traders cannot see
that they have taken place. The trading process in London is not very visible to
outsiders; only the market makers' quotes are publicly observable, but these are
often adjusted slowly and do not give a good indication of actual transaction
prices. Therefore, we decided to analyse only the transactions from the Paris
Bourse.
2. Thcoretical background.
In the market microstructure literature broadly three components of the bid-ask
spread are distinguished. The first component of the bid-ask spread is the
processing cost. This includes the pure cost of processing an order and the
compensation for the services of a dealer, i.e. the compensation for being in the
market and providing liquidity to traders. The processing cost only has an
instantaneous effect on the transaction price. Future prices are not influenced by
the presence of a processing cost component in the bid-ask spread.
The second component of the spread is due to asymmetric information between
the market maker and the public. Traders with superior information will have an
2 The mid-quote is defined as the average between the best bid and the best ask
price available.5
incentive to trade on one side of the market only. For example, a trader who knows
that the quoted price is lower than the stock's true value will have an incentive
to buy. A trade at the ask, initiated by a buyer, therefore gives the market maker
a signal that his quoted prices are too low, and he will revise his quotes upward3.
Because new information is revealed to the market with a transaction, this price
effect will be permanent.
The third component of the spread is due to inventory control. The literature
in this area4 usually considers a dealership market where professional market
makers provide liquidity and absorb order imbalances. All trades are assumed to be
executed through the market makers, whose position in the stock (inventory) in
general deviates from their desired inventory level. Therefore, the market makers
pose bid and ask quotes to encourage trades that will restore their inventory to
the desired level. For example, starting out from a balanced inventory, after a
large sale to a market maker (at the bid), his inventory will be higher than
desired, and the market maker will revise his quotes downward to encourage
purchases by the public. As a result, the price is moved in the direction of the
trade. This price effect is temporary, because in the long run the market maker is
expected to rebalance his inventory.
3. Fstimating spread components by a structural models of transaction prices.
There is a growing literature on estimation of the components of the bid-ask
spread. The early empirical papers concentrate on processing costs and one of the
other cost components. Ho and Macris (1984) estimate a model for the options
exchange with an inventory control component. Glosten and Harris (1988) specify a
model with adverse selection costs due to asymmetric information between market
participants. Both studies find that trading influences future prices. It is
unclear however, which effect is more important, inventory control or adverse
selectíon. Stoll (1989) was one of the first papers to address this question
explicitly. Stoll develops an estimator of all [hree spread components that is
based on the covariances between quote changes. This estimator has several
disadvantages, however. First, it is inefficient in cases where direct information
3 Moreover, informed traders have an incentive to trade large quantities, in order
to maximise the benefits of trading on perishable asymmetric information, cf.
Glosten and Harris (1988) and Easley and O' Hara (1987). Therefore, there is also
adverse selection in the size of the transaction: large [rades are more likely to be
initiated by informed traders than small trades. This theory predicts that large
trades will have bigger price effects than small trades.
4 See for ezample Ho and Stoll (1981).6
on the side of the market initiating the transaction is available. In such cases, a
regression based estimator such as developed in De Jong et aL (1993) is more
efficient. A second disadvantage of Stoll's analysis is that it only considers the
effect of a transaction one period ahead, and disregards the long run price
effects. This is important because it probably takes more than one transaction for
the market maker to rebalance his inventory. Madhavan and Smidt (1991) present an
elegant model for transaction prices. In their model, the market maker poses bid
and ask quotes based on his best guess of the true value of the stock and on his
current inventory. His expectation of the value of the stock after a transaction is
updated using Bayes' rule.
Estimation of the Madhavan-Smidt model requires data on the inventories of
market makers. However, for the Paris Bourse such data are not direcily available.
We also cannot construct inventory levels because we do not observe all
transactions. For example, we do not know who trades in London or on the inter-
dealer market. Therefore, we base our empirical work on the Glosten and Harris
(1988) model, which dces no[ distinguish an inventory control component. But in
contrast to Glosten and Harris we do estimate both a constant and a trade size
dependent part to both the order processing cost and the adverse selection effect.
We shall now present a short derivation of the Glosten and Harris (1988)
model along the lines of Madhavan and Smidt (1991). The main purpose of this
exercise is to show that there is an interaction between the processing cost and
the adverse selection effect. Define the following variables:
pt - transaction price
Qt - 'sign' of the transaction5
zt - signed size (number of shares traded)
yt - expected value of the stock before the transaction
~t - expected value of the stock afrer the transaction
et - publicly observed change in the value of the stock
The first equation of the model states that the transaction price is equal to the
expected value of the stock afrer the transaction, plus the processing cost which
may depend on the transaction size. We add a random pricing error, ut, that
captures other influences on the transaction price, such as price discreteness and
other factors that are not modelled. We assume that ut is uncorrelated wi[h the
other variables in the price equation. Thus, the pricing equation becomes
5 The si~;n is defined as follows: f 1 if the transaction is initiated by the buyer
(at the ask) and -1 if the transaction is initiated by the seller (at the bid).(t) pt - ut f szt t~Qt f ut,
The expected value after the transaction, ~t, is based on all publicly available
information after the transaction, and includes the adverse selection price effect.
The 'posterior' mean ~t is obtained by taking a weighted average of the `prior'
mean (the expected value before the transaction) and the `excess demand' for shares
(2) {rt - nyt t (1-n)~Pt-~ztlac].
The parameter n reFlects the degree of information asymmetry between the market
maker and the public; if there is no asymmetry then n-1. The parameter ac is related
[o the slope of [he demand function for shares. To close the model, it is supposed
that the expected value before the transaction, yt, is equal to the expected value
after the previous transaction plus the publicly observed rise in the value of the
shares between the two transactions
(3) yt - t`t-1 } et.
Together, (I)-(3) constitute the model. Substituting (2) in (1), one obtains the
transaction price as a function of the expected value before the transaction plus
the price effects of a transaction
(a) pt - yt f(x t s~n)zt f(~~n)Qt t ut,
where ~-(1R~)á. The quoted spread for size ~z ~ therefore is
(5) S(z) - 2(~Gln f(a t sln) I zI )
The decomposition of the half-spread into cost components is as follows:
Processing cost ~ t S~z~
Advnrst' st'lectinn cnst ~G~` f(a f S") ~ z~8
where y~~`-(lnn)V~ and S`-(lnn)S. From this decomposition it is clear that the
presence of a processing cost component strengthens the adverse selection effect.
Glosten (1987) provides an intuitive argument for this: if there are other
transaction cos[s besides adverse selection costs, noise traders are less likely to
trade (compared with the situation where there are no other costs) and therefore
transactions that do take place give stronger signals about the true value of the
shares. Substituting out the latent mid-price yt from (4) yields the following
regression equation:
(6) npt - (af~~n)zt - ~zt-1 } (~G~n)Qt - ~Qt-l t ft.
where ~~etfout. The components of the spread in the Glosten-Harris model can be
estimated direcdy by the following re-parametrisation of (6)
(7) opt -(at~~)zt f Rnzt f~~`Qt f~nQt f~t.
The permanent effects, attributed to adverse selection, are measured by the
ccefficients of the level variables, whereas the transitory processing cost is
measured by the ccefficients of the variables in first differences.
A number of econometric issues concerning the estimation of equation (7)
require special attention. Following Harris (1986) and Hasbrouck (1991b), who argue
that observed covariance patterns in transaction returns are more consistent with
transaction time than with calendar time, we assume that the relevant `clock' is
transaction time. We include a constant term in the model to capture the average
return between transactions (i.e. a non-zero mean of et). The variance of the
errors is unspecified by the model. For several reasons, it is likely that the
errors are heteroskedastic. For example, the variance may depend on the time of
day, and the variance may depend on the trade size. Moreover, due to the presence
of the pricing error ut, ~t has an MA(1) serial correlation pattern. With this
error structure, OLS gives consistent point estimates, but the usual standard error
formula is incorrect. We compute heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent
(HAC) standard errors by the method of Newey and West (1987). The size of the
transaction is censored at 2 times NMS, which corresponds roughly to the 99.5
percentile of the size distribution, so that 5 out of every 1000 transactions are
affected. The reason for censoring is to mitigate the effect of very large trades
on the estimates, see also Hausman, Lo and MacKinlay (1992). In the estimation, the
dependent variable is the percentage change in transaction prices, so that the9
parameter estimates can be interpreted as relative (percentage) price effects.
Overnight returns and opening prices are excluded from the sample.
In Table I the estimates of the Glosten-Harris model are presented. The table
shows that the fixed processing cost per transaction, y~, is always highly
significant, but varies quite a lot, from 0.061o for Elf-Aquitaine to 0.17qo for UAP.
The proportional processing cost, S, is negative in all cases but one (Axa-Midi)
where it is positive but insignificant. The highly significant estimates of W'
indicate that the adverse selection cost has a fixed, size-independent component
for all series. This result strongly contradicts the findings of Glosten and Harris
(1988), who report no significant fixed adverse selection costó. Only in four cases
the proportional part of adverse selection cost is significantly positive. In the
other cases the proportional adverse selection cost is not significant. The weight
of the prior mid-price in the new mid-price, n, is estimated close to 0.75 for all
series, which is slightly higher than the average of 2l3 reported by Madhavan and
Smidt (1991).
Together, the processing cost and adverse selection cost make up the bid-ask
spread. Table 1 also shows estimates of the bid-ask spread for a very small
transaction and a transaction of NMS. The estimates suggest that usually the spread
is declining in trade size, the cause being that the declining processing cost
dominates the increasing adverse selection cost. In only two cases dces the spread
increase with trade size. The estimated spreads are comparable to the results
reported in De Jong et al. (1993). Table 1 also reports the proportion of the
spread that can be attributed to adverse selection. For the smallest size, about
25~Io of the spread is due to adverse selection. Because of the decreasing processing
cost and increasing adverse selection cost, the adverse selection component at NMS
is usually much larger, about 4010 of the spread.
4. Simultaneous analysis of prices and transactions.
The structural model of the previous section gives direct estímates of spread
components. The structural approach has some disadvantages, however. First, the
estimates assume that the model is correctly specified. For example, it is assumed
that all asymmetric information is revealed immediately after the transaction so
that there is only an immediate price effect of trading and no lagged effects.
Second, it assumes that the pattem of trading is exogenous. If so, it is not
6 In their empirical work, Glosten and Harris found that only the fixed part of the
processing cost and the part of the adverse selection cost that is proportional to
trade size were significant.lo
possible to identify an inventory control component if, as in our case, inventory
data are not available.
In this section we take a reduced form approach, based on the dynamic price
effects of trading. By explicitly separating temporary from permanent price effects
the inventory control component can under some additional assumptions be
identified. Moreover, the price reaction to trades is interesting in itself. Kyle
(1985) mentions `resiliency' as one of the aspects of the quality of a stock
market. Fast recovery to the new equilibrium value after a transaction will reduce
average realised transaction costs (measured as the difference between transaction
prices and equilibrium prices). The pattern of price adjustment can be used to
construct such an alternative measure of the cost of trading.
In the literature, several components estimators based on the above ideas
have been developed. Stoll (1989) proposes an estimator based on the auto-
covariances of quote changes and transaction price changes. This estimator has
several disadvantages, however. First, it is inefficient in cases where direct
information on the side of the market where the transaction took place is
available. In such cases, a regression based estimator such as developed in De Jong
et al. (1993) is more efficient. A second disadvantage of Stoll's analysis is that
it only considers the effect of a transac[ion one period ahead, which disregards
the long run price effects. This is important because it probably takes more than
one transaction for the market maker's inventory to rebalance.
We prefer the Vector Auto Regressive (VAR) model of price changes and
transaction characteristics developed by Hasbrouck (1991a,1991b,1993). From the VAR
estimates, the complete pattern of price reaction to trades is easily computed. The





l~Ptl - lc(L) d(L)J lxt-11 } le2U V 1e2t1 - l~2 ~J
where opt denotes the price change and xt is a vector of trade `attributes', which
for our purposes includes the trade sign (Qt) and size (zt). The trade
characteristics vector, xt, is included in the equation for npt, so that for
identification the error terms elt and eZt are supposed to be uncorrelated. The
leading ccefficient b0 measures the instantaneous effect of xt on the transaction
price, and may be used as a measure of the realised bid-ask spread. This model11
allows a very general dependence of price changes and trade sign and size on the
past, without the assumption that the trade pattern is exogenous~.
Although some of the ccefficients of the VAR are interesting in themselves,
the effects of shocks on future returns and other variables are more interesting
for the purposes of this paper. In particular, we are interested in the expected
value of the stock price ~ periods after a shock, given that the system initially
is in the `steady state':
(9)
pel(7) - E(PttT-yt~elt-1' e2t-0' ept-1-0, ... xt-1-0, ...)
~2(T) - E(pt~--c-yt~elt-0' e2t-1' opt-1-0,
... xt-1-0, ...)8
Sims (1980) popularized [he idea to compute such price effects from the impulse
respnn.r~~.~ of the VAR model, which can be computed by inverting the VAR to the
following Vector Moving Average (VMA) representation:
(10)
~~x~ - fa~(W a(L), 1e2t1
To illustrate the usefulness of the VMA form, consider the equation for the price
changes in more detail
opt - ~-0akel,t-k } ~-0Ske2,t-k'
In words, the price differences are infinite sums of past innovations in the price
equation (elt) and the transaction equation (e2t). The effect of unit price and
trade innovations on the price change ~ periods ahead are measured by ai and Si,
respectively. Thus, the ccefficients of the VMA are exactly the desired impulse
responses. The effects of a unit shock on the price level t periods ahead is
measured by partial sums of the impulse responses:
~ Such an assumption was made by Glosten and Harris (1986), Hasbrouck (1988) and
Stoll (1989).
~s This equation is for the case that xt and e2t are scalar. In the case of a multi-
dimensional trade vector, the impulse responses need to be calculated from a VAR
model with orthogonal innovations. In our work, this is achieved by adding the sign
Qt as an explanatory variable in the equation for the size zt to obtain orthogonal
errors.l2
(12) pe I(~) - Ek-O~k. Pe2(t) - Ek -~k'
The pattern of price adjustment following an unexpected shock gives all the
necessary information to identify the three components of the bid-ask spread. The
bid-ask spread itself is equal to the instantaneous price effect pe2(0) of a
transaction. A close look at the VAR reveals that this equals the impact multiplier
S~, which is equal to the leading ccefficient b~ of the VAR representation. Hence,
2b~ is used as the estimator of the bid-ask spread. The processing cost is s[rictly
transitory, in the sense that the costs are paid by the initiator of a transaction
to the counterparty, but it dces not affect future prices at all. The price effects
of inventory control probably last for more periods, but eventually vanish because
it is expected that in the long run the market maker will rebalance his inventory.
The long run price effects provide a measure of the adverse selection cost. The
long run effects of shocks are easily determined as the limits of the partial sums
as r~:
(13) pel(m) - ~-pak - a(1), Pe2(m) - ~-OSk ' S(1).
Cochrane (1988) notes that this definition of the long run effects of innovations
is unique and independent of any particular decomposition of the price process in
permanent and transitory parts. Under the assumption that the full effect of
adverse selection is realised immediately after the transaction, any deviations of
the subsequent transaction price from the efficient price are due to inventory
control. Thus, the inventory control component can be estimated by subtracting the
long run effect p(1) from the initial effect, Rl.
Although for our analysis of price reactions to trades the partial sums of
impulse responses provide all necessary information, it is also interesting to
calculate explicitly the transitory component of the stock price and its variance,
which may serve as a measure of implicit transaction costs (cf. Hasbrouck, 1993).
Given our assumption that the prices and transactions are generated by a bivariate
VAR, the natural decomposition of the observed price, pt, into a random walk
component, ~t, and stationary deviations around the random walk, st, is given by
Beveridge and Nelson (1981)9. The decomposition is as follows
9 Other decompositions of the stock price in permanent and transitory components
are also possible. However, these all lead to vector ARMA models for the price-
trade process, whereas we assume from the start a VAR model. Hasbrouck (1993) shows
that the Beveridge-Nelson decomposition give a lower bound for the variance of the
stationary price part among all possible decompositions.13
(14) pt - ~t t st,
t`t - t`t-1 } (~-0"k)elt } (~-0~k)e2t'
st - ~-0~`kel,t-k } ~-0ske2,t-k' "k - ~-kt1j' Sk - ~-kflsj'
This decomposition is achieved by subtracting the long run price effects of the
innovations, given by equation (l3), from equation (11). The natural economic
interpretation of the random walk component ~t is that it is the underlying
equilibrium price of the stock, in which all public information is reflected10. The
stationary part, st, measures the deviations of the actual transaction price from
the efficient price. Hasbrouck (1993) proposes to use the standard deviation of the
stationary part, vs, as a summary measure the quality of a security market.
Intuitively, o~s reflects how closely the transaction price tracks the efficient
price on average. This `dynamic' measure of transaction costs can be seen as a
generalisation of Roll's ( 1984) estimator. Under Roll's special assumptions, a~s is
equal to half the realised bid-ask spread.
In actual empirical application of the VAR methodology, several econometric
points deserve attention. Including the sign of the transaction in a simultaneous
dynamic model creates some problems for estimation and computing dynamic effects.
Because Qt is a limited dependent variable that can only take the values - 1 and -~1,
the first equation of the VAR cannot be a conditional expectation of Qt for all
values of opt i E 6t if the ccefficients of npt i are non-zero. However, for
moderate values of opt i the linear equation may be a good approximation of the
true conditional expectation, and the bias in OLS estimates is probably not too
serious. Using Qt as an explanatory variable in the equation for npt causes no
problems, because the errors of the return equation and the other equations of the
VAR are uncorrelated, see Heckman (1978). Five lagsll in the VAR are sufficient
given the general absence of residual serial correlation in the estimated
equations. Overnight returns and opening trades are excluded from the analysis. All
reported standard errors are heteroskedasticity consistent estimates.
We first estimate the VAR using mid-quoles instead of transaction prices. An
example (for the Accor series) of the impulse responses of the mid-quote to an
unexpected shock in the sign and the trade size is graphed in Figure 1. The figure
l0 Although equilibrium retums are probably correlated over longer horizons, see
Conrad and Kaul ( 1989) and Lo and MacKinlay (1988), for the analysis of
transactions data a good working hypothesis is that the efficient price changes are
rially uncorrelated.
~1 This follows Hasbrouck ( 1991a).14
shows the typical increasing pattern of the mid-quotes after a shock, very similar
to the pattern that Hasbrouck (1991a) reports for mid-quotes on the NYSE. Table 2
summarises the estimates of the initial and long run effects of shocks on the mid-
quotes for all series. The main result is that the long run effect of trading on
mid-quotes is larger than the short run effect, which confirms the graphical
analysis. Probably, this pattern is caused by the strong positive serial
correlation in the transaction sign and size. Figure 2 shows the estimated
autocorrelation function of the trade sign (Qt) for the same example. For the other
series, the first order autocorrelation is also high, about 0.3, and decays only
slowly to zero. Hasbrouck (1991a) also reports estimates of serial correlation in
the trade sign of the same order of magnitude.
A possible explanation for this pattern is that asymmetric information is
revealed only slowly to the market in a series of transactions, rather than
immediately after the trade12. Another explanation could be the presence of `lame
duck' limit orders. Many transactions on the Bourse involve one or more limit
orders. If prices of limit orders adjust only slowly to new information, probably
because of costly monitoring and changing of existing orders, there will from time
to time be orders which are either too cheap or too expensive. If so, a number of
trades will take place on the same side of the market, causing positive serial
correlation in [ransaction sign and increasing price effects. Berkman (1992)
reports similar findings for the European Options Exchange in Amsterdam, which also
has a public limit order book.
However, all these explanations refer to the behaviour of transaction prices,
rather than mid-quotes. Therefore, in the sequel we presen[ results of the VAR
analysis on transaction price differences (returns). Figure 3 graphs the impulse
responses of transaction prices of our example series. In sharp contrast to the
result for mid-quotes, the effect of a trade on subsequent transaction prices is
virtually the same for all horizons. This pattern is similar to the results of
Holthausen, Leftwich and Mayers (1990), who found that the speed of adjustment to
the new equilibrium value after block trades on the NYSE was very fast (less than 3
trades). Table 3 confirms these results for the other series. For all series. the
short run price effects is almost equal to the long run effect. A remarkable result
is also that the estimates of the long run effects are very similar to the
12 Another popular explanation for positive correlation is that a large transaction
is split up into a series of small transactions on the same side of the market.
However, m the construction of the data we aggregated a series of transaction by
the same broker in the same minute to one large transaction. Despite this
adjustment, there still is a very strong serial correlation in Qt.15
estimates obtained by the VAR on mid-quotes. There is also a marked difference in
the price effects of small and large transactions13, the latter being uniformly
bigger.
The cause of the apparent conflict between the estimates on mid-quotes and
transaction prices must be found in the strong positive serial correlation in trade
sign and size. To see how serial corcelation affects the price effects measures,
suppose that the transaction price pt is a markup on the mid-quote, yt (cf.
equation (4)):
(15) pt - yt -F aQt f ut.
In this simple model, the impulse response of pt~~ to Qt will be a factor
a.Cov(Qt}7,Qt) larger than the impulse response of yt}~. Apparently, the positive
serial correlation in Qt exactly cancels out the slow adjustment of the mid-quotes
to their new equilibrium value. Because Qt and Qt}~ are almost uncorrelated for
large i, this model also explains why the estimates of the long run price effects
are the same whether one uses mid-quotes or transaction prices.
Table 4 reports the estimated bid-ask spread and the breakup into components.
The spread estimates are very similar to the estimates obtained from the Glosten-
Milgrom model in Table 1. The standard deviation of the stationary part of the
price, reported in Table 5, also gives nearly the same estimate. This is not very
surprising given the immediate adjustment of prices to their new equilibrium
values. The adverse selection component for small transactions is about half of the
total spread. For large transactions, the adverse selection cost estimates run as
high as SOqo. These estimates of the adverse selection cost component aze much
larger than the estimates obtained from the Glosten-Milgrom model.
There is no evidence of an inventory control effect. The estimates are all
around zero, and often negative. The pattern of serial correlations in sign and
size also indicate that there is no strong inventory control mechanism at work. At
the most intuitive level, inventory control causes so-called reversal of sign and
size, i.e. negative serial correlations. These are not present in the data at all.
Evidence in the literature for the inventory control effect is at best weak.
Madhavan and Smidt ( 1992) and Hasbrouck and Sofianos (1992) estimate inventory
control models on samples of data from the NYSE. In particular, they test for mean
13 A large transaction is defined here as a transaction of Normal Market Size. The
price effects of large transactions were computed by adding the impulse responses of
the sign and the size. The effects of a small transaction are equal to the ~mpulse
responses of a shock in the sign.16
reversion in the inventory levels of specialists. Both papers are only able to find
mean reversion in the inventory levels if they allow for speculative shifts in the
desired inventory level. Moreover, the estimated reversion to the desired level is
very slow, and takes a number of days. Therefore, for analysing intra-day price
effects, inventory control is perhaps not so relevant.
The last empirical results from the VAR analysis concern the sources of
shocks to transaction prices. Equation (12) shows that there are two sources of
changes in the efficient price: shoeks to the return equation and shocks to the
trade attributes. The former are due to publicly available information that is
unrelated to trades, whereas the latter reflect information that is revealed by the
trading process. Hasbrouck (1991b) proposes to use the proportion of the variance
in the efficient price changes due to trading as a summary s[atistic for the
informativeness of trades. In the table, this proportion is denoted by Rw x. In
line with the results in Hasbrouck (1991b), we find that between 30Ró and 40`Yo of the
variance of wt is explained by trading. The remainder is attributable to public
information that is unrelated to the trading process. This result has to be
interpreted with some caution. Recall that the regression error e2t includes the
linearisation error of the discrete sign Qt, and is therefore a combination of
innovations in the trade process and measurement errors. Hence, the variance of e2t
is larger than the variance of information revealed by trading.
5. Robust measures of price effects.
Measuring dynamic effects of trading by a VAR model is an elegant approach, but
imposes strong restrictions on the pattern of impulse responses. Moreover, the
estimated coefficients are dominated by the covariance structure on low order lags;
the long run effects are essentially determined by extrapolating the short run
pattern of correlations. Campbell and Deaton (1989) and Cochrane (1988)
convincingly argue that small changes in the VAR specification can lead to
substantial changes in the estimates of long run effects. To check the robustness
of the VAR results, we adopt a more direct approach to estimating longer run price
effects. Although this could be achieved by specifying a general non-parametric
regression function, we restrict ourselves to a simple linear parameterisationl4:
14 Several authors, e.g. Holthausen et al. (1990), Keim and Madhavan (1992) and Chan
and Lakonishok (1993), report that the price response to buyer and seller initiated
transactions on the US stock market is asymmetric. We assume linearity and hence
symmetry here to facilitate comparison of the results with the results of
parametric models, where the asymmetry is not easily included.17
(16) pe2(z) - E(PtfT-YtlQt,zt) - s~ f s~Qt t s2zt.
The ccefficients (~i and RZ measure precisely the price effects of current trade sign
and size. For t-0, estimates of the realised bid-ask spread are obtained.
This measure is not exactly equal to the impulse responses calculated before
because we do not condition on past values of sign and size. This conditioning can
be achieved by adding more lags to (16):
(17) ~2(i) - E(ptf-r-ytllt) - S~ f SjQt f S2zt t Ep-lfa'iQt-1 } S izt-1~.
where It denotes the information set consisting of all past and current trade sign
and size. The ccefficients can be estimated by simple linear regression. To increase
efficiency we use overlapping observation intervals if z~ l.
Figure 4 graphs the estimated price effects of trading for the Accor series,
obtained from regression model (16) with two additional lags for horizons up to 20
transactions. The figure shows the point estimates for the Accor price series of Ri
and pi fr32, which are the price effects of a small and large transaction,
respectively. The patterns for a small transaction are very close to the estimates
obtained by the VAR. The price effects of a large transaction are almost always
larger than the price effects of small transaction, but usually very different from
the VAR estimates15. The graphs of [he other stocks show broadly the same pattern,
and confirm the conclusion that a large fraction of the initial price effect of a
transaction persists. As before, this result implies that asymmetric information is
important and there is little evidence for inventory control.
6. Conclusions.
In this paper we analysed the in[ra-day price effects of trading on the Paris
Bourse. Special attention was paid to estimating components of the bid-ask spread:
processing cost, inventory control cost and adverse selection cost due to
asymmetric information.
One remarkable result of the analysis is the difference in components
estimates from structural models and from a decomposition of the price into
transitory and permanent components. More specifically, the Glosten and Harris
15 How significant these differences are is difficult to determine; a formal Hausman
test would be complicated because one needs explicit expressions for the standard
errors of the VAR impulse responses, which are rather complicated, see Lutkepohl
(1989).18
(1988) model estimates adverse selection cost comprises between 259b and 40ro of the
quoted bid-ask spread for small and large transactions respectively. The estimates
based on a VAR model for transaction prices suggest that from 504b (for small
transactions) up to 80R6 (for large transactions) of the bid-ask spread is
attributable to adverse selection. These numbers are larger than the estimates
obtained from the structural models, and indeed they exceed many of the numbers
reported in the literature (e.g. Stoll (1989)).
All estimates imply that processing costs decrease with transaction size,
which explains the finding in De Jong et al. (1993) that the bid-ask spread is
sometimes decreasing with trade size. In line with theoretical predictions, the
adverse selection costs increase with size. We do not find any evidence of an
inventory control effect. To the most general level, inventory control theory
predicts a reversal of trade sign and prices. In marked contrast, the empirical
results point at a strong positive serial correlation in trade sign (and size),
which cannot be explained by inventory control. Furthermore, the point estimates of
the inventory control cost are around zero and very imprecise.19
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empirical tests", Jnurnal nf Finance 44, 115-134.Table 1. Estimates of the Extended Glosten-Narris model (7).
Apt - K t (af~')zt t SAzt
} ~~Qt } ~AQt } ~t
K a.s~ s ~~ ~
AC 0.0036 -0.0219 -0.0040 0.0302 0.0816
[2.53] [1.65] [0.35] [11.26] [31.22]
AQ 0.0046 0.0157 -0.0227 0.0208 0.0590
[6.60] [3.51] [3.79] [15.32] [43.19J
BN 0.0045 0.0196 -0.0103 0.0163 0.0653
[7.57] [3.52] [2.03] [14.84] [62.62]
CA 0.0015 0.0211 -0.0212 0.0181 0.0779
[1.80) [4.04] I4.54] [11.40] [46.31]
CS 0.0152 0.0255 0.0059 0.0425 0.1227
(5.45] [1.52] [0.42] [9.66] [30.19]
EX 0.0029 0.0079 -0.0101 0.0179 0.0496
[4.38] [2.13] [2.98] [13.08] [36.36]
OR 0.0068 0.0011 -0.0139 0.0344 0.1051
[5.16] [0.08] [1.19] [13.39] [41.26]
RI 0.0135 -0.0027 -0.0311 0.0484 0.1195
[4.56] [0.13] [1.59] [9.69] [23.95]
SE 0.0029 -0.0048 -0.0254 0.0370 0.1178
(1.611 [0.301 [1.85] [11.55] [33.80]
UAP 0.0120 -0.0083 -0.0431 0.0642 0.1672






















Noies: dependent varlable fs percentaqe chanqe In transactfon prlce;
model estlmated by OLS, overnlght returns omltted; slze (z) censored at 2 NMS;
sample 24-5-91 to 31-6-91. Newey-Nest (1987) t-values In square brackets.
5(O) Is the spread for z-0, S(1) ls spread for z-NMS wlth the fractfon of 5
attrlbuted to adverse selectfon In parentheses.22
Table 2. Mid-quote effects of shocks.
small large
initial long run initial long run
Accor .0331 .0572 .0634 .1014
Elf-Aquitaine .0307 .0522 .0476 .0862
BSN .0219 .0285 .0582 .0836
Carrefour .0269 .0449 .0466 .0760
Axa-Midi .0544 .0825 .1217 .1788
Genarale des Eaux .0198 .0315 .0295 .0506
I'Oreal .0461 .0650 .0653 .1462
Ricard .0521 .0769 .0816 .1140
Schneider .0553 .0837 .0795 .1210
UAP .0631 .1040 .0882 .1470
No~cs: Thc taMc shuwx the pcn:zntage pricc zl7ccts of a ~nnsactiun by the VAR
modcl eatimaled on miJ-yuolc changea, sign anJ aiu. Thc fnn two columns ahow 1he
initiel pricz e1Tec1 0( e very anull lronaeclion end a tnnasction of unit aize
(NMS), rcspcctivzly. The scconJ pair o( wlumns ahows Ihc cnrrcq.omiing Mng run
pricc eReca ( i.e. e0er 20 innuclions).
Table 3. Transaction price effects of shocks.
small large
initial long run initial long run
Accor .0553 .0559 .0796 .0874
Elf-Aquitaine .0445 .0498 .0646 .0786
BSN .0344 .0283 .0738 .0834
Carrefour .0497 .0397 .0708 .0710
Axa-Midi .0831 .0771 .1401 .1656
Genarale des Eaux .0337 .0314 .0479 .0510
I'Oreal .0686 .0644 .1119 .1443
Ricard .0879 .0726 .1104 .0844
Schneider .0925 .0765 .0779 .0887
LIAP .1049 .1087 .1175 .1167
Notea: Thz tahk ahuws the percentage price effects of a tnnsection by Ihe VAR
model estimeted nn treneac~ion pricz chengea, sign end sizz. The firw Iwo columna
show Ihz initial price eRzct nf s very snull Innaaclion and e tnnsacUOn of unil
siu (NMS), rcapzclively. 7Te ezcond pair of columna showa the corte~onding long
run pricz effects (i.e. e0er 20 Innsactiom).23
Table 4. Components of the realised bid-ask spread.
small large
spread PC AI IC spread PC AI 1C
Accor .215 49 52 0 .244 35 72 -5
Elf-Aquitaine .167 47 60 -6 .157 17 100 -18
BSN .169 59 33 7 .199 26 84 -10
Carrefour .183 46 43 I1 .182 22 78 0
Axa-Midi .333 50 46 4 .393 29 84 -13
Genarale des Eaux .123 45 51 4 .128 25 80 -5
1'Oreal .287 52 45 3 .285 22 101 -23
Ricard .308 43 47 10 .291 24 58 18
Schneider .317 42 48 10 .245 36 72 -9
UAP .400 48 54 -2 .318 26 73 0
A snull lnnsaclion ix a hypothetical Iransaction of ave 0, whereas a large
transaction is of Nornml Market Sim.
The 'sprcad' colwnn shows Ihe esti~nated realised bid-ask sproad, derived fmm
the leading ciuTciem b0 of the VAR model cslimated on tnnssclion priccs.
The nther columns show the decomposition of Ne spread in Proceasing Cnst
(PC), Adverse Selcction cost (A[) and Inventnry Contml cosl (1C), as a
percemage of thc Imal sprcad.
Table 5. Variance decompositions.
~a Pw '~av.x
Accor 0.1038 0.0815 0.40
Elf-Aquitaine 0.0823 0.0682 0.45
BSN 0.0780 0.0483 0.34
Carrefour 0.0931 0.0700 0.28
Axa-Midi 0.1662 0.1214 0.35
Genarale des Eaux 0.0620 0.0473 0.38
I'Oreal 0.1371 O.IOl3 0.36
Ricard O.1519 O.lll8 0.34
Schneider 0.1514 0.1141 0.36
UAP 0.1827 0.1398 0.49
The Ps column shows the varianec nf thc staliu~ry pan of Ihe tranmction
price (in percem of the price), which is a mcasurc of half the bid-ask
srread.
The O'w column shows the variaix~.e of Ihe innnvations in the effrcicnt price.
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Figure 1. Impulse responses of mid-quotes; Accor.
The solid line graphs the effect on mid-quotes of a shock in the sign equation, and
the dotted line graphs the effect of a shock in both the sign and the size
equation. The estimation results are obtained from the VAR model, described in
section 4.zs
s io is 20
Figure 2. Autocorrelation function of transaction sign Qt; Accor.26
transactions from initial
Figure 3. Impulse responses of transaction prices; Accor.
The solid line graphs the effect on transaction prices of a shock in the sign
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Figure 4. Robust estimates of price effects of trading; Accor.
The solid line graphs the effect on mid-quotes of a shock in the sign, and the
dotted line graphs the effect of a shock in both sign and size. The estimation
results are obtained from regression equation (17).Uiscussion Yaper Series, CentER, Tilburg University, Thc Netherlands:
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